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LEGITIMACY AND OTHER CONCEPTS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
Samuel J.M. Donnelly* 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years I have admired my colleague, Dr. Richard 
Schwartz, 1 and his project of relating social science to the study of law. 
Dr. Richard Schwartz is not only an inspired social scientist but a very 
fascinating and friendly partner in deep conversation. After many 
discussions, I also admire his project of relating the study of law and 
social science to the task of establishing the rule of law and bringing 
greater peace and justice to our troubled world. From the perspective of 
a lawyer who reflects philosophically on legal decision making and in 
celebration of my friend, Dr. Richard Schwartz, I would like to 
contribute some modest thoughts to that very important project. 
We must recognize, of course, the great progress which has been 
made in the establishment of the world rule of law since the important 
seventeenth century developments in International Law, which so 
fascinate Dr. Schwartz.2 Since the end of World War II, we have had 
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, LL.B. Harvard University, LL.M. 
New York University. Professor Donnelly thanks his research assistant Erik Helbing for his 
work on the footnotes. This paper was prepared for a conference on the World Rule of Law 
presented at the Syracuse University College of Law to honor Dr. Richard Schwartz on the 
occasion of his retirement. 
1. Professor Richard Schwartz holds a B.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Yale 
University. He is currently the Ernest I. White Research Professor of Law at Syracuse 
University College of Law; he additionally is a Professor of Sociology at Syracuse 
University. Prior to teaching at Syracuse, Professor Schwartz taught on the law and 
sociology faculties at Northwestern and Yale Universities, as well as served as Dean of the 
law school at SUNY Buffalo. Professor Schwartz has numerous publications to his credit 
including: (1) Natural Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL 
SERVICES; (2) Human Rights in an Evolving World Culture, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (A. A. An-Nairn and F.M. Deng, eds., Brookings 1990); 
(3) Law and Normative Order, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (L. Lipson and S. Wheeler, 
eds., Russell Sage Foundation 1986). 
2. See William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 111h Proposal to 
Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 702-03 (2004). Subsequent to the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, secular international law developed. Id. This development is 
demonstrated by the treatment of Prisoners of War who became wards of the capturing 
sovereign as opposed to prizes of the capturing soldier. Id. Moreover, by the eighteenth 
century, Prisoners of War could be confined or sold into slavery, but they were no longer 
reflexively put to death. Id. 
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one of the great periods in the development of international law and the 
global rule of law.3 The development of the European Union4 and the 
progress made under the European Covenant on Human Rights5 has 
been particularly remarkable. 
When bringing social science to the study of law, understanding 
the role of law in the process of social change is central. The great 
American example of social change influenced by law begins, of course, 
with the end of our Civil War, the freeing of the slaves, and continues 
through the establishment of segregation, the attacks upon it, 
desegregation and the development of affirmative action. 
May I suggest that another very important sequence of legal and 
social changes is the development and recognition of human rights in 
the European Union since · World War · 11.6 That momentous 
development is worth studying from the perspective of law and social 
science. In the first part of the following presentation I would like to 
offer some observations on those two examples of law and social 
change over a significant period of time. Using those two examples as 
illustrations, I want to then reflect from a philosophical perspective on a 
series of concepts that I think are important in understanding the role of 
law in social change. 
In my recent book, A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step,7 I 
reflected upon the interrelation between a series of concepts including 
the rule of law and its relation to legal protection of rights; the language 
and uses of rights; legitimacy; primary social goods, a concept helpful 
in understanding rights; horizons; crossing horizons and the use of 
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
opened for signatures Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
4. The European Union was created by a treaty completed in 1992 by Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
253. 
5. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European 
Convention]. 
6. The European Union, created in 1992, is a relatively new entity. The author does not 
wish to suggest human rights advances have not taken place within Europe prior to the 
creation of the European Union as demonstrated by the European Convention of Human 
Rights in 1950. 
7. SAMUEL J. M. DONNELLY, A PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE, THE NEXT STEP: A 
PERSON-CENTERED PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Carolina 
Academic Press 2003). 
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rights to hammer on foreign horizons, or the establishment of rights 
across horizons; and analysis of the point of view from which 
statements about rights are made. 
In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I discuss, among 
other matters, how these concepts and their interrelation can be used to 
understand and construct a method for judicial decision making. The 
same concepts can be used from the perspective or point of view of a 
law reform attorney to discuss strategies for law reform.8 In this paper, 
I want to offer those concepts and their interrelation from the 
perspective of a legal philosopher and lawyer as a possibly helpful 
means for analyzing the gradual establishment internationally and 
throughout the world of the rule of law accompanied by the advance of 
human and civil rights. Perhaps these · concepts also may prove helpful 
to social scientists as well as legal philosophers in discussing and 
understanding the role of law in the process of social change. That 
social change may include the gradual establishment of the rule of law 
both within individual countries and internationally. Part of my 
argument is that advances in the protection of individual rights also 
support the developing rule of law and vice versa. I want to organize 
that discussion around an analysis of the language and uses of rights 
including how rights are used in the process of social change and how 
the pursuit of rights relates to establishing the rule of law. What do we 
mean, then, by the rule of law? And how is the rule of law related to 
legal protection or protection by courts of individual rights? In the 
second part I want to address those questions. 
Then, in Part III, I should address what we mean by rights. How 
do we discern fundamental rights and why should we recognize those 
rights? How do rights come to be perceived as legitimate? Legitimacy, 
rights and primary social goods is the topic of Part III. Primary social 
goods is a concept I have taken from John Rawls and adapted to my 
own understanding. Rawls has an important discussion of the relations 
between primary social goods and the principles of justice.9 
In my understanding, rights always are perceived within horizons 
and from a point view. In Part IV, I want to discuss rights, horizons and 
point-of-view analysis. In the international sphere, one could argue that 
a number of controversies arise because particular rights or questions 
concerning the existence of rights are perceived within the horizons of 
8. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 283-89. 
9. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 396-99, 433-39, 447 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1971); see also Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Towards a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic 
Insights and Concepts, 28 LoYL.A. L. REV. 547, 587-88 (1995). 
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different cultures. An advocate for rights may have to cross or penetrate 
foreign horizons in order to persuade persons of another culture to 
accept certain rights. 
To accomplish law reform, to produce social change, the advance 
of rights and the rule of law may require those studying or seeking to 
promote those changes to understand horizons and the art of crossing 
horizons. Since rights, as I perceive them, always are understood within 
a horizon and from a point of view, those promoting or studying social 
change, law and rights should strive to understand the use of rights and 
the language of rights as tools for crossing horizons, for hammering on 
foreign horizons or encouraging others to cross horizons. Rights 
traditionally may be understood as remedies offered by law, as 
conclusions drawn within a legal system or in more advanced theory as 
reasons for decisions, or reasons in the decision making process which 
will trump competing reasons. From the perspective of one studying or 
promoting law reform, I am suggesting that we understand how rights 
are used as tools, as goals to be pursued in the law reform process, as 
means for achieving those goals, and as political resources. 10 In Part V 
then, I will address the language and uses of rights: rights as tools in the 
process of social change. 
Finally, I would like to recognize Dr. Schwartz's admiration for 
natural law not only for its contributions to the seventeenth century 
development of international law but also as a warehouse of resources 
for the establishment of the world rule of law and the recognition of 
human rights. Using the concepts developed in the previous discussion, 
I want to reflect on what we mean by, and how we use, natural law and 
how it might contribute to understanding and advancing human rights, 
the rule of law and the process of social change, which may lead to their 
acceptance. 
When reflecting on these topics, I will be commenting from the 
perspective of a lawyer and philosopher of law. That precisely is not the 
perspective of a social scientist. From my ignorance, I would describe a 
social scientist as concerned with description and explanatory theory. 
Some explanatory theories are particularly powerful and grand. 
Lawyers hardly ever seek explanatory theories of the kind admired by 
social scientists and normally do not emphasize description as a primary 
task. Lawyers are concerned with decision making and persuading 
decision makers. Understanding law from the point of view of the 
10. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 254-60; see also SAMUEL J.M. DONNELLY, THE 
LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS: A BIOPSY OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 1 (Univ. Press of America 1994). 
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decision maker is central to a lawyer's work and central to legal 
philosophy as practiced in America. 11 To the extent that social 
scientists and legal philosophers provide lawyers with reflections on 
decision making or tools for decision making they may be very helpful 
to intelligent practicing attorneys. 
I want to take the perspective of one performing that task in the 
following discussion. Promoting human rights and establishing the 
global rule of law is a task for statesmen and lawyers, as well as an 
academic subject to be examined from the perspective of legal 
philosophers and social scientists 
I. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: GREAT EXAMPLES 
To study the promotion of human rights and the establishment of a 
world rule of law, we must think about social change both worldwide 
and in individual countries. We must also study the role of law in social 
change. 
A. Brown v. Board of Education 
The great example, studied by many social scientists, of the 
interaction of law and culture resulting, perhaps, in social change are the 
legal, political and cultural events and circumstances just ~rior to and 
following Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. 2 Actually, 
that sequence of legal and cultural changes began almost two centuries 
before that great 1954 decision of the Warren Court. 
Arbitrarily, I would select 1773 and the equally great decision of 
King's Bench in Somersett v. Stewart13 as the starting point for the 
falling dominos that led to the abolishment of slavery, desegregation 
and ultimately affirmative action in the United States. In Somersett, 
Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice speaking for King's Bench in a 
habeas corpus case, freed a black slave, James Somersett, who was 
being held at his master's orders on a ship in the Thames for sale in 
Jamaica. 14 Mansfield found the return on the writ insufficient since 
there were no relevant laws, cases or statutes authorizing slavery in 
England. 15 He explained that slavery was too obnoxious to be 
11. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 74-83; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 
154-55 (Belknap Press 1986). 
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). 
14. See EDMUND HEWARD, LORD MANSFIELD 144 (Mary Rose Ltd. London 1979). 
15. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1936). 
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established by custom. 16 Given the common law doctrine of precedent, 
Mansfield in effect abolished slavery in England and freed 14,000 or 
15,000 slaves.17 
A short law reform campaign preceded Somersett, largely 
conducted by a London radical, Granville Sharp, who had obtained the 
writ of habeas corpus for James Somersett from Lord Mansfield.18 
More significant for the study of law and social change is the gradual 
fall of the dominoes after Somersett v. Stewart. That decision made in 
1773 before our Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would be 
considered binding precedent in most of our American States. 19 Why 
then did slavery not immediately fall in the United States? Mansfield's 
decision in Somersett turned on the absence of legal authorization, 
either statutory or case law, for slavery. A number of our states 
particularly in the South had legislation regulating slavery. 
Nevertheless, Somersett v. Stewart was an important precedent, which 
gave legitimacy to the abolition movement in the United States, 
England and the British colonies. 20 
Duncan Kennedy describes "legitimacy power" as an important 
16. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 269. 
17. HEWARD, supra note 14, at 146-47. 
18. Id. at 144-45. 
19. Available studies strongly suggest that the current consensus that "common law" 
was a technical reference to the rules of law and methods of procedure of the three royal 
courts at Westminster was not a consensus of 1791 or prior. In 1952, Chafee reviewed the 
scope of the unwritten law administered in the thirteen original colonies. He noted at least 
four recognized meanings of the phrase "common law:" (1) the systems of law "now 
prevalent in the United States and most of the British Commonwealth of Nations" in 
contrast with the civil law system "derived from Roman law;" (2) the "law common to all of 
England" in contrast with the law of local English jurisdictions; (3) "unwritten law in 
contrast with legislation;" and (4) the "law applied in the Courts of Common Pleas, King's 
Bench, and Exchequer" in contrast with that "applied in the Court of Chancery." See 
Richard E. Coulson, Is Contractual Arbitration an Unconstitutional Waiver of the Right to 
Trial by Jury in Oklahoma?, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1991)(citing Chafee, 
Colonial Courts and the Common Law, 68 PROCEEDINGS, MASS. HIST. Soc. 132 (1952)), 
reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARL y AMERICAN LA w 5 3 (Univ. of North Carolina 
Press 1969). Compare Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding 
Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 474-75 
(2003) (Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Law of England were read 
throughout the Atlantic world, maintained that the American colonies were "conquered or 
ceded countries" and "therefore the common law of England, as such, has no authority 
there; they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions." 
He accounted for any resemblance by supposing that the colonists had "copied the spirit of 
their own law from the original" and declared that they remained "subject ... to the control 
of parliament."). 
20. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 267. 
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element in social change through law.21 As our discussion proceeds, we 
should pay some attention to the notion and uses of legitimacy power. 
In England, shortly after Somersett, Granville Sharpe22 began to 
use his newly acquired legitimacy power to attack the slave trade. In 
Somersett, Mansfield had been careful to abolish slavery only in 
England. He distinguished the slave trade, which was important to the 
commerce of England, and did not affect it. Granville Sharpe, however, 
persuaded a young member of parliament, who ultimately became Lord 
Wilberforce and one of the great figures in the war against Napoleon, to 
file a bill abolishing the slave trade. 23 That bill was filed and ignored 
each year for twenty years until it was finally passed in 1807, in the 
middle of the war against Napoleon.24 Stopping ships to search for 
illegal slaves was probably an aid in the blockade of Napoleonic France. 
It has been rightly remarked that an ideal coupled with an interest is a 
21. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A 
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). 
22. Granville Sharpe's activities in the English anti-slavery movement predate 
Somersett. For example, in 1765 as Granville was visiting his brother William in Mincing 
Lane he stumbled upon a poor black man by the name of Jonathan Strong. Strong was the 
property of David Lisle, an attorney from Barbados. One day Lisle in a fit of rage beat 
Strong over the head with the butt of a pistol, until Strong was almost blind. Because, a 
blind slave is of no value to his master, Lisle turned Strong onto the streets to die. 
Thereupon the Sharpe brother arranged for Strong's admittance to a local hospital, where he 
remained for four months. See HEWARD, supra note 14, at 140-42. 
After his recovery Strong secured employment as an errand boy for an apothecary. One 
day by accident, Strong ran into his former master, who upon seeing Strong was of some 
value, sold Strong to James Kerr. Kerr arranges to kidnap Strong and have him imprisoned 
at Poultry Counter Prison, while he awaits a ship to transport Strong to the Indies. At this 
point Granville appears before Sir Robert Kite, Lord Mayor, to complain that Strong is 
imprisoned without a warrant. Kerr produced the bill of sale, and the Lord Mayor declared 
Strong to be the property of Kerr. Nevertheless, the Lord Mayor rules that not even a slave 
can be imprisoned without a warrant, and thus allowed Strong to walk out of the courtroom. 
Kerr proceeded to sue Granville for £200 for deprivation of property. These charges were 
later dropped. Id. 
23. William Lord Wilberforce (1759-1833) was educated at the University of 
Cambridge. Lord Wilberforce was elected to Parliament in 1780, and embraced Evangelical 
Christianity in 1784. Lord Wilberforce emerged as the abolitionist movement in the House 
of Commons. In 1807, Lord Wilberforce secured enactment of a bill prohibiting the slave 
trade. In 1823, Lord Wilberforce was a founding member of the Anti-Slavery Society. In 
1825 because of poor health, Lord Wilberforce was forced to resign from the House of 
Commons. The bill abolishing slavery passed one month after Lord Wilberforce's death. 
See 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 300-01 (1986). 
24. In the United States, the slave trade could not be prohibited until 1808. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I§ 9 cl. 1. In 1807 Congress passed an act to abolish the slave trade (but not the 
institution of slavery) on January 1, 1808. See An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves 
Into Any Port or Place Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, From and After the First 
Day of January, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eight, ch. XXII 
3 Stat. 426-30 ( 1807). 
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powerful political force. 
The slave trade was effectively brought to a halt after England, and 
the United States agreed in the 1840's to joint patrolling of the coast of 
Africa by the British and American fleets. 25 At that time, England was 
attempting to obtain toeholds on the coast of Africa. Again, we see the 
power of an ideal coupled with an interest. 
In between those events at the Congress of Vienna, at the close of 
Napoleon's wars, the great powers of Europe agreed to the abolishment 
of the slave trade.26 Participation in the slave trade was thereafter added 
to piracy as a crime of international Jurisdiction, crimes which could be 
prosecuted and tried by any nation. 2 Please observe the gradual social 
change influenced by law leading towards the establishment of human 
rights and the rule of law. And note the importance of legitimacy power 
in that process. 
The dominoes, of course, fell dramatically thereafter, first in the 
Caribbean, 28 then the American South, 29 and ultimately in Brazil. 30 The 
25. See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 572. 
26. At the advent of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 800 petitions were presented to 
the British House of Commons to stop the international slave trade, this public pressure 
spurred the British government to press for action at Vienna. See Steve Charnovitz, Two 
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 
192 (1997). However, the only agreement that could be achieved was a declaration 
condemning the slave trade. See Declaration of Eight Courts Relative to the Universal 
Abolition of the Slave Trade, Feb. 8, 1815, 63 Consol. T.S. 473. Nevertheless, numerous 
treaties were signed between individual nations concerning the slave trade. See, e.g., Treaty 
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Sept. 23, 1817, Gr. Brit.-Spain, 68 Consol. T.S. 45; 
Treaty at The Hague, May 4, 1818, Gr. Brit.-Neth., 68 Consol. T.S. 403; Declaration 
Respecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Nov. 28, 1822, Aus.-Fr.-Gr. Brit-Prussia-Russ, 
73 Consol. T.S. 31; Slave Treaty, Nov. 6, 1824, Gr. Brit.-Swed.-Neth., 75 Consol. T.S. 1. 
27. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 13, 13 U.S.T. 2376, 450 
U.N.T.S. 90; RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONS § 404 (1987). 
28. In 1791 the Blacks in Haiti entered into a full-fledged rebellion that would result in 
the creation of the State of Haiti and the abolition of slavery. In 1801 Toussaint Louventure 
proclaimed himself governor of St. Domingue (Haiti), and a constitution was passed 
abolishing slavery. In 1802 the French arrested and exiled Louventure to France where he 
died a year later. The Haitians then purchased their independence from France. After the 
assassination of Emperor Dessalines in 1806 the country split in half. In 1822 Jean Pierre 
Boyer invaded the eastern part of the island, unified the island, and abolished slavery. See 
Synopsis of Haitian History, available at 
http://www.discoverhaiti.com/history_summary.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005). 
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1. 
30. Slavery was abolished in Brazil in several stages. In 1871 the "Law of the Free 
Womb" freed all children born of a slave, but the master retain labor rights until the child 
reached the age of twenty-one. In 1885 the law freed all slaves over the age of 60. In 1888 
the "Golden Law" freed all remaining slaves without compensation to the owner. See From 
Slavery to Abolition in Nineteenth Century Brazil, at 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-caguirre/381_14.html (last visited, Apr. 29, 2005). 
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great drama, culminating in the abolishment of slavery, came to an end. 
But then a new episode, a sequel, began as the American South 
replaced slavery with segregation throu~h a long series of struggles 
culminating legally in Plessy v. Ferguson. 1 
Following Plessy, a new era of law reform began, not unrelated to 
Somersett v. Stewarr2 and the abolishment of slavery. The great law 
reform campaign organized by the NAACP beginning in 1929 
gradually, case by case, established legitimacy power for 
desegregation. 33 The work of their lawyers, however, was not the only 
force leading in 1954 to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas. 34 
Arguably the era of law which William Wiecek describes as legal 
classicism came to an end with Franklin Roosevelt's appointments to 
the United States Supreme Court in the late 1930's.35 At the time of 
Brown v. Board of Education, many of the Roosevelt appointees were 
still serving on the Court. 36 In my book, A Personalist Jurisprudence, 
The Next Step, I describe some of the forces leading to Brown as 
follows: 
The period between 1937 and 1954 was a tumultuous 
time including the end of the Great Depression, the Second 
World War, the Holocaust, the Korean War and the 
beginning of the Cold War confrontation with Russia. 
Arguably these experiences changed our national outlook 
and understanding. On racial questions, the experience of 
Americans in the armed forces, Truman's desegregation of 
the military and the shock of the Holocaust prepared our 
31. 63 U.S. 537 (1896). 
32. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). 
33. See, e.g., Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri must offer African-
Americans substantially equal legal education, effectively requiring Missouri to admit 
African-Americans to a white school); see also Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 
332 U.S. 631 (1948) (State law schools cannot discriminate against African-Americans); 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Union representatives under 
the Federal Railway Act cannot discriminate in representation of members on the basis of 
race); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Racial restrictive covenants in private housing 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
35. WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND 
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
36. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144. The Roosevelt appointees to the Court at the 
time Brown was decided were in order of appointment: Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix 
Frankfurter, William Douglas, and Robert Jackson. Id. 
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national culture for a changed position on race. Legally the 
demise of legal classicism and the advance of pragmatic 
instrumentalist thought was helpful. The great law reform 
campaign conducted by lawyers for the NAACP be.finning 
in 1929 had established a series of useful precedent. 3 
The process of social change leading to and following from Brown 
has been the subject of many social science studies.38 Controversially, 
the Brown Court relied on social science studies including Gunnar 
Myrdal's An American Dilemma, in support of its decision. 39 In 
contrast, the quality of the reasoning process in Brown has been the 
subject of many competing works of legal philosophy. The quarrels 
over Brown may be the heart of what I describe as the modern great 
quarrel over method. 40 
From the perspective of a legal philosopher questions such as how 
should Chief Justice Warren have justified his decision in Brown, and is 
the decision justifiable, are the fascinating questions. From the 
perspective of a law reformer, examining the strategies of the NAACP 
and Thurgood Marshall is an important study.41 A very helpful work of 
social science derived from the effort is Stuart Scheingold, The Politics 
of Rights. 42 What I am suggesting is that social scientists who want to 
contribute to the advance of human rights follow the example of 
Scheingold. Legal philosophers creating or criticizing decision making 
methods should struggle to understand the relation between social 
forces and the work of decision makers. 
37. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144-45. 
38. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 4-6 (Yale Univ. Press 1974). 
39. The studies relied on by the Court to assess the effect of school segregation include 
inter alia: "[1] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality 
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); [2] 
Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; [3] Deutscher and Chein, 
The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 
J .PSYCHOL. 259 ( 1948); [ 4] Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under 
Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); [5] 
Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (Maciver, ed., 1949), 
44--48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally 
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11 (italics added). 
40. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 153. 
41. See id. at 283-89. 
42. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38. 
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B. European Human Rights 
On October 29, 2004, the members of the European Union took a 
further major step towards advancing human rights and the rule of law 
on their continent. They signed a Constitution for the European 
Union.43 The new Constitution contained a list of fundamental rights: 
life, integrity of the person, marriage, freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion, expression and assembly, education, work, asylum, equality, 
equality between men and women, social security, health care, 
environmental and consumer protection, petition, fair trial and 
presumption of innocence.44 
The signing of the new Constitution is the latest in a long series of 
events starting after the Second World War with establishment of the 
United Nations. The 1945 U.N. Charter, in Article 55, authorized the 
United Nations to "promote ... universal respect for and observance of 
human rights. "45 In 1946, the Commission on Human Rights was 
created under Article 68 of the U.N. Charter46 to draft human rights 
treaties implementing Article 55. In 1948, the General Assembly 
contributed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a means for 
defining the rights to be promoted and respected under Article 55 of the 
U.N. Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights47 was not a 
treaty and not legally binding on member States.48 However, two basic 
treaties were adopted in 1966 and offered for ratification to member 
States, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights49 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 50 
43. See Graham Bowley, Heads of State Sign the European Union's First Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A3. 
44. See generally Treaty Establishing A Constitution For Europe, CIG 87 /04 (Aug. 6, 
2004). 
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c. 
46. Article 68 of the U.N. Charter provides "The Economic and Social Council shall set 
up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and 
such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions." Id. at art. 
68. 
47. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. N1810 (1948). 
48. Article 11 of the United Nations Charter mandates that any matter brought before it 
where action is necessary must be referred to the Security Council by the General 
Assembly. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 2; see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 110 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th 
ed. Oxford Press 1963) (resolutions passed by the United Nation's General Assembly are 
not binding on member states). 
49. ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
50. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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In the meantime, the Council of Europe, which was created in 
1949, during 1950 offered its member States the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,51 
which became effective after ratification in 1953. This treaty has been 
ratified by all the members of the Council of Europe. The European 
Convention on Human Rights initially was enforced by the European 
Commission on Human Rights. Cases which could not be settled by the 
persuasive power of the European Commission on Human Rights would 
be referred to the Council of Europe's committee of ministers. 
Alternatively, member States or the Commission could refer cases to the 
European Court of Human Rights whose decisions would be enforced 
by the Commission on Human Rights. 52 
A new and more powerful European Court of Human Rights was 
established in November 1998.53 Now, individuals with human rights 
complaints may proceed directly in the Court of Human Rights. One 
should note, of course, that the Council of Europe should be 
distinguished from the European Union and the Court of Human Rights 
from the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
The European Convention on Human Rights has had wide impact 
on the advance of human rights in Europe. That influence was 
summarized in 1994 as follows: 
In Austria where the Convention has the rank of 
51. European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
52. Prior to the adoption of Protocol 11 in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights 
operated as follows: (1) The European Commission on Human Rights considered the 
admissibly of the case. (2) If the case was admissible, the Commission determined the facts 
and attempted to secure a friendly settlement. (3) The Commission prepared a report 
regarding unsettled cases, including a finding of facts and its opinion with regard to 
violations. This report went to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
During the next three months the Committee, Commission, or any interested state party 
could refer the case to the Court. N.B. individual claims came before the court only through 
the Commission because only states and the Commissions could bring cases to the Court. 
Since the adoption of Protocol 11 in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights hears all 
cases alleging violations of individual rights, the function of the Commission and the 
Commission itself has been terminated. See LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS 57-58 (West Group 2003). 
53. Prior to 1998 the Committee of Ministers was an alternative to the European Court 
of Human Rights as a body for determining breaches of the European Covenant of Human 
Rights. In 1998 the State members of the Council of Europe decided in Protocol 11 to the 
European Covenant of Human Rights to abolish this role. As such, the European Court of 
Human Rights is currently the only body competent to determine breaches of the European 
Covenant on Human Rights. See Robin R. Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, The Collective 
Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring 
Compliance with Economic and Social Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 417, 455 (2004). 
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constitutional law, the Code of Criminal Procedures has had 
to be modified as a result of case-law in Strasbourg; so too 
the system of legal aid fees for lawyers. In Belgium, 
amendments have been made to the Penal Code, its 
vagrancy legislations and its Civil Code to insure equal 
rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. In Germany 
modifications that bring legislation better into line with the 
Convention's provisions have also been made ... 
In the Netherlands where most of the Convention's self-
executing substantive provisions are endowed with a 
hierarchically superior status to the Constitution itself, 
changes have been made in the Military Criminal Code and 
the law on detention of mental patients. In Ireland, court 
proceedings have been simplified and civil legal aid and 
advice schemes set up ... 
In France, the law relating to the secrecy of telephone 
communications had to be altered, while in Italy a new 
Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted to change the law 
concerning regulation of detention on remand ... 54 
245 
Great Britain is the member of the Council of Europe who has been 
most frequently before the European Court of Human Rights.55 For a 
number of years the United Kingdom, where the Queen in Parliament is 
sovereign and where there is no written constitution, did not include the 
European Convention on Human Rights in its domestic law. Now, 
however, Parliament has enacted the Convention on Human Rights as 
part of British domestic law thereby making human rights litigation and 
law reform campaigns possible in England. 
This gradual expansion and acceptance of a European regime of 
rights of course, was influenced by the Second World War, the 
Holocaust, and the Cold War. If one compares the legal, political and 
cultural circumstances in Europe today with those in 1935, 1945 and 
1965 one should notice remarkable changes influenced by the legal 
developments just described. 
54. Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principle Characteristics of the 
New ECHR Control Mechanism, As Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed on 11 May 
1994: A Single European Court of Human Rights is to Replace the Existing and Commission 
and Court in Strasbourg, 15 HUM. RTS. L. J. 81, 82-83 (1994). 
55. MALONE, supra note 52, at 58 (explaining that unlike most countries in Europe the 
United Kingdom has no constitution or domestic guarantee of individual rights, therefore 
individuals are forced to use this court in protecting their individual rights). 
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II. THE RULE OF LAW 
The English speaking countries of the world are renowned citadels 
of the rule of law. Historically, a State monopoly for the use of violence 
is central to the rule of law. If the State cannot provide security for its 
citizens against private violence then it looses legitimacy. From the 
time of the conquest, English kings put a strong emphasis on the 
suppression and control of private violence and we in America have 
followed their example. In the English speaking countries, however, the 
rule of law has a long standing association with the protection of civil 
liberties. An interesting question is why the protection of civil liberties 
should be associated historically with the advance of the rule of law. 
A possible answer is that in our understanding the rule of law 
governs those in authority as well as members of the public. Under the 
rule of law citizens should be protected by law against their government 
as well as against private violence. The courts are the traditional 
instrument in the English speaking countries for securing that 
protection. 
The courts have another important role in maintaining the rule of 
law. Instead of fighting in the streets, instead of resorting to private 
violence disputants are encouraged to take their cases to court and abide 
by the result. In Somersett v. Stewart, 56 which ended slavery in 
England, Granville Sharp, the London radical, served the writ of habeas 
corpus issued by Lord Mansfield on Captain Knowles who was holding 
the slave James Somersett on his ship in the Thames.57 Instead of 
raising his sails and sailing to Jamaica Captain Knowles appeared in 
court and made a response to the writ.58 I describe Captain Knowles as 
the law abiding ship captain. 
Because people bring their disputes to court and abide by the 
result, courts have power, are able to maintain the rule of law and can 
advance civil liberties. From the experience of the English speaking 
countries and other parts of our world we can develop some suggestions 
which are not particularly original for advancing the world rule of law. 
A. The Control of Private Violence 
The advance of the rule of law within a particular country depends 
on providing security, on effectively controlling private violence. On 
the world stage the United Nations, the Security Council or some 
56. 98 Eng. Rep. 499. 
57. See HEWARD, supra note 14, at 144. 
58. Id. 
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similar institution must have the authority to authorize the international 
use of violence by one country against another.59 International violence 
without authorization should become illegal. 60 International law is 
moving in that direction, but has not yet established central control of 
international violence. 
B. The Role of Courts 
Historically, courts have two important roles in maintaining the 
rule of law: (1) protecting civil liberties by subjecting government 
officials to the rule of law, and (2) contributing to the control of private 
violence by encouraging disputants to bring their disputes to court and 
abide by the result. The two roles are not unconnected. 
In any particular country, encouraging the citizens to bring their 
disputes to court rather than fighting in the streets would be a positive 
contribution to the rule of law and would lay a foundation for courts to 
assist in the protection and advance of civil liberties. 
Internationally, we are making some progress in the establishment 
of courts to which countries and their citizens can bring their disputes. 
The progress in particular regions of the world is more remarkable. 
Most remarkable is the growing power of the courts of the European 
Community. In Europe, the European Covenant on Human Rights, the 
work of the European Court of Human Rights, and the gradual inclusion 
of the covenant in the domestic law of the European states is dramatic 
progress, although progress that was made gradually. 
C. Gradual Progress Can Be Made Towards Establishing the 
International Rule of Law in Several Ways. 
Using European developments as a model, regional courts can be 
59. In the current state of affairs the ability of members of an international organization 
to set aside their personal bias is questionable. For example, when the United States 
brought a motion before the U.N. Security Council to enforce the cease fire agreed to by 
Iraq in 1991, several nations vetoed it. It later came to light that these nations (France, 
Russia, and China) were receiving kickbacks from the oil for food program, and as such had 
incentive not to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
60. There have been several attempts throughout history to outlaw war. See, e.g., 
Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 28, 
1929, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; see U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 1, which provides in 
pertinent part: ("To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach 
of the peace."). 
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established. Within countries international investment and commercial 
activity will be advanced by growing acceptance of the rule of law and 
by the availability of courts which will resolve commercial disputes.61 
International commercial treaties, arbitration and the availability of 
courts for dispute settlement gradually will accustom disputants to 
taking their disputes to court and abiding by the results. 62 
D. There Is a Close Connection Between the Function of Courts In 
Protecting the Rights of Citizens Against Their Governments and the 
Establishment of The Rule of Law. 
The rule of law, as we understand it, requires that government 
officials be governed by law. When courts enforce that, the confidence 
of citizens in the courts and their willingness to bring their disputes to 
court should increase, thereby reducing at least the major incidents of 
private violence. Surely, the series of propositions I just offered can be 
transformed into hypotheses, which can be studied using the tools of 
social science. 63 
III. LEGITIMACY, RIGHTS AND PRIMARY SOCIAL GOODS 
Legitimacy power, according to Duncan Kennedy, is enhanced 
when a judge decides an important pace-making case, a significant step 
in law reform, while offering good legal arguments in his opinion in 
support of the decision. 64 Changes or developments in law or legal 
institutions can enhance the legitimacy power of the courts or society or 
they can produce legitimacy costs. 65 Ultimately, Brown v. Board of 
Education66 enhanced the legitimacy power and the historical reputation 
of the Warren Court. The decision itself is one of the great historic 
achievements of our court system. It has a quality, which I describe as 
ultimate legitimacy. Nevertheless, in its immediate aftermath and over 
the years, the Brown decision produced legitimacy costs. 67 
61. For example (1) The London Court oflnternational Arbitration; (2) European Court 
of Arbitration; (3) The Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
62. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 62. 
63. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL AND JULIAN c. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (Houghton Mifflin 1963). Quasi-experimentation 
constitutes a class of empirical studies that lack two of the usual features of 
experimentation: (1) the lack of full control, and (2) absence ofrandomization. Id. 
64. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 527-28. 
65. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 10. 
66. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
67. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 150 (a decision is supported by ultimate legitimacy 
if it is by reasons that have the possibility of being acceptable to all persons at all times 
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Legitimacy power can accumulate slowly case by case during a 
sequence of law reform or over the history of an institution. A judge 
who renders a series of important decisions supported by good legal 
argument grows in legitimacy power.68 As an example, consider Judge 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo and such decisions as MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co. 69 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. 7° Consider as a 
second example the growing legitimacy power of the institutions of the 
European Union. 
Various authors offer differing theories of legitimacy. In my book, 
A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I compare, for example, the 
differing views on legitimacy of Cass Sunstein71 and Ronald Dworkin.72 
One can derive insights re~arding legitimac~ from the now ancient 
quarrel between H.L.A. Hart 3 and Lon Fuller. 4 Hart understood law as 
a system of rules accepted by the people and spent considerable time 
explaining what he meant by acceptance. Lon Fuller was more 
concerned with the circumstances and conditions which would enhance 
the acceptability of law and make it more likely that it would be 
acceptable. An inquiry using the tools of social science into the 
qualities which make law or changes in law more likely to be acceptable 
would seem to advance our understanding of how to promote the rule of 
law and the advance of human rights. 
Dworkin contends that the legitimacy, and I would say the 
acceptability of law, is grounded "not in the hard terrain of contracts or 
duties of justice or obligations of fair play that might hold among 
strangers, where philosophers have hoped to find it, but in the more 
because they are based on respect and concern for each person.) N.B. all persons need not 
accept the reasoning the mere possibility of acceptance by all suffices. 
68. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 527-28. 
69. 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916). 
70. 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928). 
71. See DONNELL y' supra note 7' at 39 (discussing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 53 (Oxford Univ.Press 1996)). Sunstein argues: 
"Legitimacy stems not simply from principled consistency on the part of the adjudicators, 
but from a justifiable exercise of authority, which requires a theory of just institutions. That 
theory should in turn be founded in democratic considerations suitably constrained by an 
account of what interests should be immunized from democratic intrusions. Legitimacy is 
an outcome of well-functioning democratic processes, not of a system of distinction-making 
undertaken by judges. Even if done exceptionally well, distinction-making by principled 
judges is too court-centered as a source oflegitimacy." Id. 
72. See DWORKIN, supra note 11. 
73. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Laws and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593 (1958). 
74. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958). 
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fertile ground of fraternity, community and their attendant 
obligations."75 Dworkin argues that "[p ]olitical association, like family 
and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate is 
itself pregnant of obligation. "76 Dworkin' s understanding of legitimacy 
then resembles his theory of political friendship. 
Political friendship, as a grounding for the legitimacy and 
acceptability of law and society's institutions, would seem to present 
both problems and opportunities for furthering the global rule of law. A 
new institution, an international court, for example, does not fit easily 
into the existing pattern of political friendships and interactions. 
However, as human interactions slowly grow around that new 
institution it will become more acceptable. Witness the growth in 
authority and legitimacy of the European courts. Those activities may 
be the normal interactions of people who move from country to country. 
In our world today commercial activities will be an important element 
of those interactions which lead to political friendships. 
Personalist theory, as I describe it in my book, A Personalist 
Jurisprudence, The Next Step, offers a foundation for political 
friendship in the perception that persons are interrelated, that we are 
more fully persons when in relation with other persons. 77 At the 
foundation of personalist theory is the perception of a necessary 
interrelationship between persons and a commitment to afford each 
person deep respect and concern. 78 That perception and that 
commitment provide a basis for personalist acceptance of Dworkin' s 
theory of political friendship.79 Political friendship as understood in 
view of that perception and commitment then leads to a theory of rights, 
obligations and legitimacy. 
In personalist theory, one has an obligation to 
cooperate in building and maintaining the reasonable 
institutions of the society in which he finds himself, that is 
because one has a duty of respect and concern for the 
persons with whom one inevitably is engaged in interaction. 
75. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 206. 
76. Id. 
77. The personalist ideal, "is a universal community of persons in which each cares for 
all other" because "the self-realization of any individual is only fully achieved if he is 
positively motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation." See 
DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 99-100 (quoting JOHN MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION 
159 (Faber London 1970)). 
78. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 88. 
79. Id. 
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One interacts with others through language, through the 
circumstances of daily living, through all the ways in which 
one exists in modem society. One understands himself as a 
person through that interaction with other persons whom 
one perceives in the course of action as persons. 80 
251 
The theory of rights like the theory of political obligations arises 
from that perception of persons acting together in society and hence 
growing more fully as persons. Each person under personalist theory 
has a right to participate in the common action of society and a right to 
the means necessary for that participation. 81 
The means necessary for participation in the common action of 
society could be described as the primary social goods. The primary 
social goods are those necessary or important both generally and in any 
particular society for participation in the common action of that 
society. 82 The concept, primary social goods, is borrowed from John 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice and slightly transformed. Rawls would 
define the primary social goods as those necessary to pursuing any 
rational plan in life. In Rawls' theory the principles of justice derived in 
his Original Position are those which will assure all parties the best 
chance of maximizing their share of the primary social goods on lifting 
of the veil of ignorance and the best chance of minimizing disastrous 
losses of the primary social goods. 
In Eersonalist theory without the crutch or aid of the Original 
Position 3 and the Veil of Ignorance, 84 the primary social goods 
nevertheless are very helpful in constructing a theory of rights. Basic 
80. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 241. 
81. Id. at 296. 
82. See id. at 101. 
83. See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 118. The original position is a model to help man 
detennine what is just or unjust. In this model there are numerous pieces of a game that 
make decisions that affect society as a whole. While making these decisions it is assumed 
that the parties will make decisions that tend to maximize the potential good they can 
experience, while at the same time minimize the potential hann they can suffer. After the 
pieces of the game make their decisions the ultimate decision maker, i.e., the player of the 
game, makes the ultimate decision if a proposed rule of law is just. 
84. Somehow we must "nullify the effects of specific contingencies, of the pieces in the 
original position that put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural 
circumstances to their own advantages." In order to accomplish this goal Rawls assumes 
the pieces are situated under a veil of ignorance. While under the veil the pieces do not 
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged 
to evaluate the principles solely on the basis of general consideration. Furthennore, while 
under the veil the pieces do not know inter alia: (1) their place in society; (2) class; (3) 
social status; (4) fortune; (5) intelligence; or (6) strength. Id. at 136-37. 
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rights are those designed to protect the primary social goods. A number 
of these rights would be found in our United States Constitution and 
some in the rest of our law.85 In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next 
Step, I argue: 
Respect, then, for each person's right to participate in 
the intersubjectivity or political friendship of the common 
action, the life of the community becomes the basis for the 
primary rights. Primary rights are those which would 
protect against deprivation of the personal, economic, and 
political goods necessary to basic participation in ant 
society's and in this particularly society's common action.8 
In personalist theory, the understanding of legitimacy is grounded 
in political friendship, respect and concern for each person, persons 
interacting in the common action and their right to the primary social 
goods necessary to continue that participation. 87 Legitimacy in 
personalist thought then shares a common grounding with the theories 
of rights and obligations. 
In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I argue that "[a] 
society is legitimate to the extent that it strives to advance and protect 
everyone's and each one's share of the primary social goods."88 
Particular institutions and activities of society are legitimate insofar as 
they share or participate in society's mission of enhancing the common 
action, affording respect and concern for each person and protecting and 
improving each person's share of the primary social goods, that is, each 
person's opportunity to participate in the common action of society.89 
For example, the judicial system is legitimate because by 
reasonable settlement of disputes it advances and maintains the rule of 
law.90 Members of society are encouraged by the possibility of 
reasonable settlement of disputes to bring their cases to court rather than 
85. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VI, VIII, XIV (Freedom of Speech and Press 
(Amendment 1); due process of law (Amendments 5 and 14); trial by jury and confrontation 
of witnesses (Amendment 6); and prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment 
(Amendment 8). 
86. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 107-08 (quoting Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Towards 
a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic Insights and Concepts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 547, 589 
(1995)). 
87. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 75. 
88. See id. at 241. 
89. Id. at 239-46. 
90. Id. at 240. 
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fight out the disputes in the streets. If they can obtain fair results in 
challenges through judicial proceedings against government officials 
that will advance the rule of law and reduce incentives to violence. 
Maintaining the rule of law in this manner, a principal mission of the 
courts, advances everyone's share of the primary social goods and 
opportunity to participate in society. 
I have just offered then a set of interrelated concepts and perhaps 
theories, understandings of rights, obligations, legitimacy and the 
primary social goods all grounded in respect and concern for each 
individual and each person's interaction with others in the common 
action of society. 
A question then proposed is whether those concepts are helpful in 
studying or practically advancing human rights and the rule of law both 
internationally and in particular countries. For example, if one is 
attempting to establish a stable and legitimate government in a 
"disorderly" comer of the world, a series of concrete steps would be 
sponsored by the theories just advanced: 
First, in order to maintain the rule of law, the government must 
substantially suppress private violence. By providing that security to 
society most citizens share of the primary social goods will be enhanced 
thereby advancing the legitimacy of the government. 
Second, at a reasonably early stage there should be a court system, 
which will entertain private actions. Members of society hopefully will 
bring their disputes to court rather than fight in the streets. By this 
means, private violence will be reduced further, primary social goods 
will be protected and the legitimacy of society advanced. 
Third, government members should be subject to the rule of law 
thereby advancing the protection of rights, the rule of law, and 
everyone's share of the primary social goods. For those reasons, the 
new government will be perceived more clearly as legitimate. 
Fourth, basic human rights or some of them should be protected by 
the government producing similar results. 
Now, adapt that set of steps to the establishment of a regional 
union, for example, the European Union. The victory of the Allies 
during World War II and the eventual demise of the Cold War 
established internationally within Europe a reduction and control of 
violence followed by treaties codifying that elimination of violence.91 
91. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Alb.-Bulg.-Hung.-F.R.G.-Rom.-U.S.S.R.-
Czech Rep., May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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The European Covenant on Human Rights92 and a court designed to 
enforce that covenant93 were established. The Court of the European 
Communities94 as well as the Court of Human Rights95 provided forums 
for the settlement of disputes. We have witnessed a gradual advance in 
the stability of Europe and the legitimacy of the European Union.96 
What I am offering, of course, are some interrelated concepts 
which may be helpful in understanding the advance of the rule of law 
and the related promotion of human rights. Social scientists must tell 
whether they can make use of these concepts and practitioners will 
discover whether they are useful as a basis for refining their tools. 
Ultimately the test of this pudding will be in the eating. 
Some of the obstacles to the further development of the 
international rule of law and the advance of human rights perhaps may 
be captured in some further but related concepts. In the next part, I 
want to discuss the problem of horizons and the various points of view 
from which rights are perceived. 
IV. THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS: RIGHTS AS TOOLS IN THE 
PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
A great obstacle to the advance of human rights and to the 
establishment in the international sphere of the rule of law is the 
phenomenon I refer to as horizons. This is a familiar phenomenon. In 
international human rights discourse, one regularly encounters the 
discussion of whether economic rights are more important than civil 
92. See generally European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
93. Id. at art. 19 (creating the European Court of Human Rights). 
94. See Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Aug. 6, 004, art. 1-29 CIG 
87/04. 
95. European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 19. 
96. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (a decision by 
the Congress of the European Movement in May 1948 created the Council of Europe); see 
also Andrea Schultz, The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 355, 357 (2002) 
(within the framework of the Council of Europe certain organizations were created having 
authority to control the application of the Statute viz. The European Commission of Human 
rights in 1954 and The European Court ' of Human Rights in 1959 ("These Council of 
Europe organs are not to be confused with the European Commission, i.e., the executive of 
the European Union and with the European Court of Justice")). Id. at n. 8. 
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liberties or vice versa.97 Not surprisingly, the priority for economic 
rights is favored in some developing countries with strong or dictatorial 
central regimes while thinkers like John Rawls, writing in democratic 
countries, would favor a priority for civil liberties.98 Likewise, rights 
considered basic and important in European and Western circles are 
questioned in the Middle East. 99 
In my book, A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I argue 
that every statement concerning rights is made within a horizon and 
from a point of view. 100 I would like to begin this part of the discussion 
by elucidating that argument and by explaining the terms horizon and 
point of view. 
The term "horizon" is used by philosophers such as Bernard 
Lonergan, 101 Martin Heidegger102 and Hans Georg Gadamer103 as a 
metaphor to discuss "the normal human condition of having limited 
knowledge and understanding." Literally, horizon refers to the line at 
the edge of the sky and earth which marks the limits of our physical 
vision. We all know that there are mountains, valleys, cities and lakes 
beyond the circular line of the horizon and hence beyond our physical 
vision. A valuable aspect of the metaphor is that we also know that we 
can cross beyond our present physical horizons and find those cities and 
97. It has been argued that Asian Countries disagree with the theory of individual 
human rights the West uses, instead arguing the principle need in Asia is economic 
development contrary to the importance the West places on civil and political rights. 
Moreover in Asia social and economic rights are more important and will receive a higher 
priority. See, e.g., Bina D'Costa, Challenges for an Independent Asian Human Rights 
Commission ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615 (1998); see also RAWLS, supra note 9, at 53 
(Lexical priority of principle of equal liberty or over the second property of fair 
distribution). 
98. See Robert Burns, Law and Social Theory: Rawls and the Principles of Welfare 
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 184, n. 35 (1988) referring to RAWLS, supra note 9, at 60-90 ("One 
may compare Rawl' s exposition of the varying degrees of equality required in political and 
civil rights as opposed to social and economic rights."). 
99. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 51 (Auth. Ed.) ("Many 
Americans have wondered, 'Why do they hate us?' some also ask 'What can we do to stop 
these attacks?' Bin Laden and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions. To the 
first, they say ... America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. [T]o the 
second question ... America should abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the 
immorality and godlessness of its society and culture." Id. 
100. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 260. 
101. See BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 235-36 (2d ed.) (1970). 
102. See MARTIN M. HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 34-35 (J. Stamburgh trans. 
1969). 
103. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 303, 306-07 (Joel Weinsheimer 
& Donald G. Marshall, trans., 1975). 
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mountains. I can leave this university, hop into my car and drive to 
Skaneateles Lake. If I do, my whole view, my physical scenery and my 
emotional mood, will change. 
Likewise, we can cross our intellectual and cultural horizons. I can 
leave the law school and cross the parking lot to the Maxwell School of 
Citizenship where I can study economics, history or sociology, thereby 
changing my intellectual outlook and vision. 
Horizons, both physical and intellectual, create and also confine 
vision. I can see to the edge of the horizon to the limits of my current 
knowledge and interest, but not beyond. By crossing horizons 
physically and intellectually, I can expand my vision. Fascinatingly, 
however, when I cross horizons I find myself in a new horizon which 
also creates and confines vision. When I leave college with a degree in 
economics, sociology or history and enter law school I find new vision 
but gradually forget and loose interest in the social sciences. 
Horizons affect our understanding of rights. A philosopher and a 
lawyer will discuss rights differently as will persons brought up in 
various cultures. Representatives from the Near East, for example, 
regularly tell us that our Western understanding of rights does not make 
sense in their cultures. A familiar phenomenon, however, is that a 
person returning to the East from an education in Paris or Boston may 
tum out to be an advocate for a more western understanding of rights in 
his or her home country and culture. 104 Sometimes what Hans-Georg 
Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons takes place. 105 
To understand statements regarding rights, I often argue, one must 
recognize that every rights statement is made within a horizon and from 
a point of view. A district attorney talking about rights, perhaps the 
rights of a victim, is speaking from a different point of view and perhaps 
with a different meaning than a defense attorney. The judge's point of 
view is yet different. Social scientists and some legal philosophers 
could talk about rights from a descriptive point of view. That very 
definitely is not the point of view of a law reform attorney campaigning 
for the establishment of new rights. 106 That would not have been the 
point of view of Thurgood Marshall during the long campaign leading 
to Brown v. Board of Education. 107 
A law reformer such as Thurgood Marshall or Granville Sharpe 
104. Such an example is the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi. 
105. HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, supra note 103, at 306-07. 
106. See Donnelly, supra note 7, at 283-89. 
107. 347 U.S. 483. 
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following Somersett v. Stewart, 108 would not perceive rights 
descriptively, or as entitlements, or as conclusions to be drawn within a 
system of law. Probably he would find Llewellyn's Holmesian 
understanding of rights as predictions that a court would afford a 
remedy only moderately helpful. 109 Rather he would perceive rights as 
goals to be pursued and great decisions such as Somersett v. Stewart or 
Brown v. Board of Education not only as important victories but also as 
resources for further pursuit of the goal of complete abolishment of 
slavery and the slave trade or of desegregation. As Stuart Scheingold 
points out, the legitimacy power of a great victofl becomes a resource 
for the next battle in the further pursuit of rights. 11 
Likewise, from the point of view of a judge, that is, the point of 
view of one concerned with action, with deciding a case, rights are not 
predictions of what a court will in fact do. The point of view of a judge 
is neither a descriptive nor a predictive point of view. According to 
H.L.A. Hart, a judge may perceive rights as conclusions to be drawn in 
a system of rules. 111 Or he may perceive the rights he is about to 
establish as an appropriate resolution in his culture of a long standing 
dispute. 
Both the judge and the law reform attorney should be conscious of 
the phenomenon of horizons. When a law reformer is addressing a 
judge whose horizons are narrow, he must find a way to make his 
arguments comprehensible within the narrow horizons of the judge.112 
In the alternative, he must find ways to persuade the judge to cross 
beyond those narrow horizons to see and understand the problems of his 
client. 113 Some great appellate advocates have that skill. 
As Stuart Scheingold points out, rights are resources to be used in 
the political campaign for law reform. 114 The legitimacy power of 
courts allows a reform campaign to rally its supporters and to attack its 
opponents. When arguing before a judge, a law reform attorney may 
use the legitimacy power of rights to hammer on the judge's narrow 
horizons demanding that the judge respect and pay attention to his 
client's rights, his client's interests and his client's standing as a 
108. 98 Eng. Rep. 499. 
109. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 254 referring to Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 462-63 (1930). 
110. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84. 
111. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 255. 
112. Id. at 283-89. 
113. Id. 
114. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84. 
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person. 115 
Events in the wider world may provide society and courts with the 
vital experiences necessary to abandon or cross old horizons. Not long 
before the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 116 the world was 
challenged by the experience of World War II and the Holocaust. In the 
United States, shortly before that, we had the experience of the Great 
Depression and after the war, Truman's desegregation of the military, 
the beginning of the Cold War and the Korean War. All of these 
experiences along with the NAACP' s extensive law reform campaign 
would have contributed to the new necessary change of horizons that 
made Brown v. Board of Education possible. 117 World War II, the 
Holocaust, and the Cold War also were experiences that changed 
European horizons and contributed to the new atmosphere which 
allowed development of the EuroRean Union and the evolutionary 
advance of human rights in Europe.1 8 
A law reformer, or one concerned with the advance of the rule of 
law and human rights, should be conscious of the phenomenon of 
horizons, of the experiences which open the opportunity for expanding 
our horizons and should seek the tools necessary for hammering on 
foreign horizons. Among those tools is the legitimacy power of rights 
which can be used as a resource in pursuing further goals like 
establishing additional or more fundamental rights. 
From the perspective of a conscientious judge, consciousness of 
the phenomenon of horizons would be significant. A judge recognizing 
his horizons, his limited knowledge and understanding, and desiring to 
decide justly or perhaps having a commitment to respect and concern 
for all persons should accept an additional and corollary obligation to 
115. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 283-89. 
116. 347 U.S. 483. 
117. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144-45. 
118. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, et al., Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion 
of European Union Authority Into U.S. Business Mergers and Competition Practices: U.S. 
Multinational Businesses Underestimate the Strength of the European Commission from 
G.E.-Honeywell to Microsoft, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 571, 573-74 (2004) ("When the Cold 
War threat, hanging over Europe for decades, was eliminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, Europe was free to develop its centralized institutional structure ... "); see also 
Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons from 
the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 769, 823 (2004) (citing Eric S. Hochstadt, The 
Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 318 (2002)) 
("The creation of the European Union and the Common Market itself finds much of its 
foundation in rebuilding a war tom continent following the end of the Second World War 
and the desire for an economic unity and interdependence, especially in the post-Cold War 
era."). 
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cross horizons and to develop methods for crossing horizons. 119 Social 
science and social science data, despite or perhaps because of their 
controversial use in Brown v. Board of Education, 120 are among the 
tools for enabling a judge to cross horizons and recognize the impact of 
his decisions on those in foreign horizons. A commitment to, and 
methods for, crossing horizons are both a means for promoting human 
rights and a topic for exploration by legal philosophers and social 
scientists. 121 
The process of developing and establishing rights then should be 
perceived and studied in relation to the problem of horizons, the 
possibility of crossing horizons and the means for doing that. 122 
Lawyers, legal philosophers and social scientists can study the problems 
from various points of view. Accordingly, lawyers and legal 
philosophers should be conscious of horizons and should seek to create 
tools for crossing them from the point of view of the judge and the point 
of view of an advocate for the disadvantaged. 123 
The advance of rights, perhaps with the help of horizon crossing 
techniques, is related in turn to the advance of the rule of law and to the 
legitimacy of new governmental arrangements perhaps regional unions. 
To the extent that rights are secured and recognized within a horizon, 
people are encouraged to take their disputes to court, to settle them 
peacefully, to sue government officials or entities who are subject to the 
rule of law rather than starting revolutions or campaigns of terrorism. A 
law reform campaign seeking the establishment of new rights is a 
substitute for revolution. That campaign can take place within a 
particular country, within a regional organization, such as the newly 
developed structures in Europe, or hopefully on a global scale in the 
future. The availability and regular use of the process of law reform to 
establish rights should contribute to the legitimacy and stability of 
governments and regional organizations. The regular use of law reform 
campaigns should contribute to strengthening and expanding the rule of 
law. 
For that purpose it helps to understand rights not simply as rules or 
entitlements but as tools, perhaps as language tools for the 
accomplishment of human purposes. In my book, A Personalist 
Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I describe a number of different uses of 
119. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 86-87. 
120. 347 U.S. 483. 
121. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 294. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 260. 
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the language of rights. Rights may be perceived as remedies or 
predictions that a court may afford a remedy, as conclusions drawn 
within a system of rules by way of a judicial decision, by arguments for 
that decision, or criticisms of it, as reasons for that decision, as 
particularly powerful reasons which will trump competing reasons, as 
goals to be pursued, or as resources for pursuing those goals. 124 
V. NATURALLAW 
In the first volume of his A History of the English-Speaking 
Peoples, 125 Winston Churchill discussing the Magna Carta explained: 
If the thirteenth century magnates understood little and 
cared less for popular liberties or Parliamentary democracy, 
they had all the same laid hold of a principle which was to 
be of prime importance for the future development of 
English society and English institutions. Throughout the 
document it is implied that here is a law which is above the 
King and which even he must not break. The reaffirmation 
of a supreme law and its expression in a general charter is 
the great work of Magna Carta; and this alone justifies the 
respect in which men have held it. The reign of Henry II, 
according to the most respected authorities, initiates the rule 
of law. But the work as yet was incomplete: the Crown was 
still above the law; the legal system which Henry had 
created could become, as John showed, an instrument of 
oppression. 
Now for the first time the King himself is bound by the 
law. The root principle was destined to survive across the 
generations and rise paramount long after the feudal 
background of 1215 had faded in the past. The Charter 
became in the process of time an enduring witness that the 
power of the Crown was not absolute. 126 
In this passage Winston Churchill sketches some major steps in the 
establishment of the rule of law. Most importantly, the 
institutionalization of a higher law, accomplished through the Magna 
124. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 255-59. 
125. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE 
BIRTH OF BRITAIN 256-57 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1956). 
126. Id. 
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Carta, subjects the king to the rule of law. When the government is 
subject to the rule of law, we have a strong foundation for the 
development of civil liberties and the advance of human rights. The 
institutionalization of higher law for this purpose is in the main stream 
of the natural law tradition. 
Natural law in its many incarnations over the ages . has served as a 
vast storehouse of resources for the advance of the rule of law. 127 The 
Romans borrowed the notion of natural law from Greek philosophers, 
particularly the Stoics, and used it to mold the law necessary to govern 
their vast empire. 128 As their empire grew, the Romans confronted a 
problem not entirely dissimilar to the current world situation. For the 
sake of commerce, good order and justice the Romans required an 
international law, a law of nations, a }us gen ti um, as they described it. 
That }us gentium should not be the law of a particular state including 
their own. Rather they drew on the themes common to many laws to 
create a higher law. The labors of the great Roman jurists, in 
developing the }us gentium and the }us naturalis, were ultimately 
codified by the Emperor Justinian in his famous Codex which has 
served to advance the rule of law over the ages. 129 
Medieval natural law, 130 as Churchill explained, influenced the 
Magna Carta distinctively, jump-starting the history of English civil 
liberties. The tradition, which began with the Magna Carta, supported 
by the natural rights philosophy of John Locke, provided a foundation 
for the overthrow of the Stuart kings and their pretensions to 
absolutism. 131 About the same time, the great seventeenth century 
127. See, e.g., ALESSANDER PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Hutchinson Univ. Library 1951); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province Trans., Benziger Bros. 1947); 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLIC; HUGO GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625); 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1682); JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAGUI, 
PRINCIPLES DU DROIT NATUREL (1747). 
128. See D'ENTREVES, supra note 127. 
129. Judge Albert Rosenblatt of the New York Court of Appeals states: "At its height, 
the Roman Empire ruled over much of the known world. It is a tribute to the Roman sense 
of pragmatism that they were able, with almost scientific ability, to craft laws of such 
universality as to seem part of the natural order of things. As a model rule of law for all 
Western society, culminating in the Justinian Code of the sixth century, the articulation of 
law by Rome, must be counted as a giant stride in the history of law on this planet." See 
Albert M. Rosenblatt, The Fifty-Fifth Annual Cardozo Memorial Lecture: The Laws 
Evolution: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2133-34 (2003). 
130. See, e.g., Aquinas, supra note 127, at 505-06. 
131. Cf Edward S. Corwin, Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 10, 104 
(1910). 
29
Donnelly: Reflecting On The Rule Of Law, Its Reciprocal Relation With Right
Published by SURFACE, 2005
262 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 32:233 
natural lawyers, Grotius 132 and Pufendorf, 133 whom Dr. Schwartz 
admires greatly, were using the resources of the natural law tradition to 
form the foundations of modem international law, 134 a distinct advance 
in establishing a world rule of law. 
Thomas Jefferson, in the next century, drew on John Locke's 
natural rights theory to lay, in the Declaration of Independence, the 
foundation for development of the American tradition of human and 
civil rights. 135 In tum, the American tradition made perhaps the most 
significant contribution to the modem worldwide advance of human 
rights. 
The notion of a higher law, whatever its foundation, is the essential 
contribution of the natural law tradition to the advance of the rule of law 
and the promotion of human rights. 136 In the absence of positive law, a 
}us gentium or modem international law can be developed on the 
foundation of that higher law. Under the authority of that higher law, 
kings and governments can be subjected to the rule of law and their 
132. See GROTIUS, supra note 127, at 38-39. 
133. See PUFENDORF, supra note 127. 
134. See Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered 
Women's Right to Self-Defense, 71 CHI. L. REv. 1749 (2004). Prior to the adoption of the 
United Nations Charter, the concept of }us ad bellum--or a just use of force or recourse to 
war-had developed over several thousand years. This theory was the product of early 
Greek philosophers such as Aquinas and secular theorist of just war such as Grotius 
developed this concept through analogy and reference to an individual's right to self-
defense. Id. 
135. Locke stated that "men formed society primarily to secure their natural rights of 
life, liberty, and property." See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 42 (2002). Jefferson's first 
draft of the Declaration of Independence copied Locke's trinity verbatim. See 
MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY 269 (Frank N . Magill ed., Harper Collins 1990). 
However, the Declaration final draft read, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men ... " See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (1776). 
136. Cicero argued: "True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of 
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands and 
averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay it commands or prohibitions 
upon good men in vain, though, neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to 
alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to 
abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and need 
not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be 
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one 
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be 
one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its 
promulgator, and its enforcing judge." See CICERO, THE REPUBLIC THE LAWS 68-69 (Niall 
Rudd trans., 1998). 
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citizens' civil and human rights can be protected against those ruling 
powers. That protection of citizens and control of rulers, however, as 
we examine our history, has been promoted best by the 
institutionalization of that higher law. To mention some instances, that 
institutionalization of higher law is represented by the Magna Carta, 137 
by the British Bill of Rights of 1688, 138 by the American Constitution 
and its own Bill of Rights139 as administered by our Supreme Court, by 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 140 by the Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights, 141 and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 142 by the European Union, 143 by the European Convention on 
Human Rights,144 by the European Court of Human Rights. 145 
From that history clues can be derived for advancing the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights in our modem world. Our 
developing international law could serve as the higher law which could 
subject otherwise unrestrained rulers to the rule of law and respect for 
the human rights of their citizens. 146 There is some indication in the 
flow of current events that this process is beginning. 147 It is necessary, 
however, to institutionalize that process probably through the United 
Nations and regional organizations modeled on the European Union. 
The set of related concepts offered in this paper and discussed 
above in Parts II through V may be helpful to understanding the relation 
between a higher law perhaps derived from natural law, the institutions 
which apply that higher law and the evolutionary development of the 
rule of law and the related advance of human rights. Those concepts 
include the rule of law; the language and uses of rights; primary social 
137. See generally MAGNA CARTA (1215). 
138. See generally BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1689). 
139. See generally U.S. CONST. 
140. See Universal Declaration, supra note 47. 
141. See ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
142. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 . 
. 143. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 311.L.M. 253. 
144. See European Convention 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
145. This court was created in Article 19 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. See id. art. 19. , 
146. See David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling 
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 231, 233 
(2002). "Beginning with the Holocaust, the international community began to treat genocide 
as criminal under international law, rather than excusing it as an unfortunate (but necessary) 
incident to state sovereignty." Id. 
147. Id. at 234. This process began with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following 
the Second World War. More currently this is demonstrated by war crimes tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 235. 
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goods; legitimacy; horizons; crossing horizons; point of view analysis; 
and the use of rights as tools in the process of social change. 
As just explained, the institutionalization of natural law or higher 
law can be used to subject rulers to the rule of law. That advance of the 
rule of law in turn creates respect for the rights of citizens. While a 
government controlled by an uncommanded sovereign may exercise 
legitimacy power, it will also suffer legitimacy costs. 148 When the 
government is subject to the rule of law and respects the rights of 
citizens, those legitimacy costs are reduced. There is a desirable 
relation then between legitimacy, the rule of law, and respect for rights. 
Institutionalization of a higher law will advance the rule of law, respect 
for rights and, ultimately, legitimacy. 
To be successful, however, an institutionalization of a higher law 
must be perceived as legitimate or must acquire legitimacy. This new 
regime of rules, as H.L.A. Hart points out, must be accepted by the 
people149-that is the challenge that confronts a new regional 
international organization, a new international court, or new efforts by 
the United Nations or world powers to enforce the rule of law in defiant 
Third World countries. The successful exercise of that international 
power to advance the rule of both law and human rights will enhance 
the legitimacy power and acceptance of the new organization. Initially 
and throughout its development, the new international organization will 
confront the problem of horizons. Successful horizon crossing 
techniques will contribute to its success. 
From the earlier discussions, however, a number of other 
suggestions can be derived for enhancing the legitimacy and 
acceptability of a new international organization or a new exercise of its 
power. The world powers seeking perhaps through pressure or invasion 
to subject rulers of particular countries to the world rule of law should 
themselves be subject to the rule of law. A powerful country, France, 
Britain, or the United States will exercise greater legitimacy power if its 
enforcement activities are conducted through or are authorized by the 
United Nations or by a regional union, for example the European Union. 
The development of additional regional unions would be desirable. The 
exercise of power in the international realm, without the cloak of 
legitimacy, will suffer legitimacy costs and hypothetically will be more 
difficult and less enduring. Repeated successful enforcement of the rule 
of law, with legitimate authorization, in contrast, should enhance the 
148. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 244-46. 
149. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 114-20 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) noted in 
DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 233. 
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world rule of law and its legitimacy power-that in tum, by subjecting 
rulers to the rule of law should advance human and civil rights. 
Rights themselves, as they become more widely accepted, become 
tools in the campaign to expand rights but also to advance the rule of 
law. Rights may be used in this campaign simply as a particularly 
effective form of rhetoric. 150 They can be used and are currently used in 
third world countries, and the United States, to hammer on foreign 
horizons, calling attention to oppression and persons who are oppressed. 
If forums, particularly but not exclusively courts, are available for 
asserting rights, then rights litigation will be more effective. Rights 
litigation then will become an important tool for gradual advancement 
of the rule of law and human and civil liberties. Such courts could be 
world courts but perhaps more usefully and effectively regional courts 
or even courts within particular countries. The incorporation of the 
European Covenant on Human Rights into the domestic law of 
particular European countries was a positive advance which should 
allow more effective law reform litigation. 
The United Nations, world powers, international or regional courts 
all should be conscious of the problem of horizons when seeking to 
advance or enforce human rights and the rule of law. Horizons are 
expanding gradually, for example, by repeated, sensitive and successful 
rights litigation. Gradual development of rights and the rule of law 
accompanied by repeated understanding and crossing of horizons will 
support the legitimacy of the rule of law and the new regime of rights. 
There is a linkage between the rule of law, the advance of rights, the use 
of rights to hammer on foreign horizons, the understanding of rights 
within those foreign horizons, the crossing of horizons, the use of rights 
in the process of social change and legitimacy. The rule of law provides 
legitimacy for rights litigation and reform. In tum, rights litigation 
provides legitimacy for the rule of law. That legitimacy is enhanced, 
and legitimacy costs are reduced if courts and others enforcing rights 
and the rule of law understand horizons and are committed to crossing 
horizons. 
Legitimacy, of course, is linked also to protection of the primary 
social goods, those goods necessary to participation in any society or 
this society. The importance of assuring security and economic well-
being to legitimacy is clear from recent experience. The great rights are 
those which protect each person's share of the primary social goods, 
each person's life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Advance of the 
150. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84. 
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great rights also advances the rule of law and legitimacy, the 
acceptability and the conditions for acceptance of the regime of law. 
The interdependence of these concepts, legitimacy, rights, primary 
social goods, the rule of law, horizons and so on, could be described as 
an aspect of the functioning of natural law. From experience, including 
the experience of lawyers, judges and rights litigators, they are also vital 
concepts and tools in the institutionalization of natural law, a higher 
law, the rule of law. I submit that this process can be studied from the 
perspective of lawyers and legal philosophers and the perspective of 
social scientists. What should be studied is the use of tools of law and 
government in the process of social change, the advance of human 
liberties and the rule of law. We are accumulating examples both 
within countries and in the international arena of that process of social 
change. 
St. Paul once described what has come to be called the natural law 
as written in the hearts of human persons. 151 As a scripture scholar Paul 
was drawing on a thousand years of learning in the tradition descended 
from Abraham, which many of us hold in common. A reasonable 
interpretation of that could be put as follows. 
In the course of human interaction and experience we gradually 
come to understand our fellow human beings as persons who share 
human feelings, desires, sufferings, and moral struggles. 152 Out of that 
understanding, grow respect and concern for others, for many others. 
That respect and concern can be contemplated philosophically, be 
generalized, be transformed into individual and community 
commitments, be institutionalized into the rule of law, great ideals, 
respect for rights, the importance of courts and of rights litigation and 
reform. It is a gradual process, a process of continual development of 
human experience, influenced by vital and sometimes traumatic 
experience, by World Wars, by the abolition of slavery, by the 
Holocaust, by the successful establishment of regimes of rights such as 
the European Union. An important part of natural law as so understood 
is the process of social change and the role of human experience and 
ideals in that process of social change. 
Natural law then is not a set of propositions or even ideals 
151. Romans 2:14-16. ("Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature 
things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the 
law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their 
consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending 
them ... This will take place on the day when God will judge men's secrets through Jesus 
Christ, as my gospel declares.") Id. 
152. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 233-38. 
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important as they are to natural law but a process of human experience 
by which our regard for our fellow human beings grows, is generalized 
into ideals and commitments, is institutionalized and regularly changed, 
as by crossing horizons and gathering the experience of life, our 
understanding and regard for our fellow human persons deepens and 
broadens. Honoring Dr. Richard Schwartz's interest in natural law and 
his great work in law and social science, I submit that this process 
particularly as it is represented by institutionalized social change can be 
studied by lawyers, legal philosophers and social scientists. 
CONCLUSION 
A central theme of this paper is that a desirable relation exists 
between legitimacy, the rule of law and respect for rights. I argue that 
there is a reciprocal relation between the rule of law and respect for 
rights. To the extent that a government is subject to the rule of law, the 
human and civil rights of its citizens are advanced. In tum, as citizens 
with confidence bring disputes concerning violation of their rights to the 
courts, rather than seeking remedies in the streets, the rule of law is 
enhanced. Both respect for rights and the rule of law are likely to make 
governments more acceptable to their citizens and hence more 
legitimate. Effective establishment of the rule of law and respect for 
rights will enhance everyone's share of the primary social goods and 
consequent ability to participate in society. A basic requirement of 
legitimacy is that a government ought to protect and enhance everyone's 
basic share of the primary social goods. Understanding and crossing 
horizons allows courts, rulers and law reform litigators to understand 
rights and basic interests, i.e., primary social goods, in the context of 
foreign horizons. Consequently, understanding and crossing horizons 
increases the likelihood that citizens will feel respected and will in tum 
respect the rule of law. Rights themselves should be perceived not 
merely as statements of ideals or entitlements but as goals to be pursued 
and as tools to be used in pursuit of those goals. Rights should be 
perceived and used as tools in the context of horizons, as means for 
crossing horizons, for pursuing law reform and should be understood 
from various perspectives or points of view including those of a judge 
and law reformer. Rights then are tools for hammering on foreign 
horizons, advancing the rule of law, and enhancing the legitimacy of a 
society. 
From the perspective of a legal philosopher reflecting on the 
history of law and social change with a view to framing tools for 
lawyers and decision makers and engaged in developing judicial 
decision making method, I have argued in my book, A Personalist 
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Jurisprudence, The Next Step, that recognizing the interrelation between 
the concepts just reviewed is remarkably helpful. In this paper, I offer a 
discussion of these concepts and their relationship in honor of Dr. 
Richard Schwartz and to those concerned with understanding social 
change facilitated by law as a means for advancing a global rule of law 
and enhancing human rights. 
Whether it is possible or helpful to use these concepts and their 
interrelation from the point of view of a social scientist studying law 
and social change, I leave to those educated in that foreign horizon and 
hence more knowledgeable than me. 
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